Experimental studies with captive animals show strong preferences for immediate reward. Several authors have argued that these tendencies to discount delayed reward may severely limit the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game as a model of animal cooperation. This paper explores a simple mechanism, dubbed cumulative games, that can, in principle, promote cooperative action even when there is strong temporal discounting. In the simplest type of cumulative game a pair of players does not receive bene"ts at the end of each play, as in a conventional repeated game, but must complete a sequence of games before collecting the accumulated bene"ts. In a preliminary analysis pitting tit-for-tat against all-D, I show that accumulation can promote a conditionally cooperative strategy even when there is strong temporal discounting. However, the delays created by accumulation de-value the pairwise interaction, so although the relative value of cooperation increases, the total value of the interaction decreases. I investigate accumulation further by simulating the evolution of a broader class of strategies. These simulation studies show that accumulation, and small discounting rates (high future value) can both promote cooperative action. The limitations of these results are discussed.
Introduction
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game has been a central part of the theory of non-kin cooperation for nearly two decades (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) . The IPD is an important and informative thought experiment that has stimulated a large body of ingenious theory. Recently, however, several authors have challenged the pre-eminence of the IPD, questioning its empirical support, and criticizing its relatively narrow realm of applicability (Packer & Ruttan, 1988; Heinrich, 1988 Heinrich, , 1989 Pruett-Jones & PruettJones, 1994; NoeK , 1990; Dugatkin et al., 1992; Grinnell et al., 1995; Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; Connor, 1995a; Clements & Stephens, 1995; Stephens et al., 1995 Stephens et al., , 1997 Pusey & Packer, 1997) . My laboratory has been among those criticizing the IPD on empirical grounds. We have found that pairs of captive bluejays are strongly attracted to the mutual defection equilibrium of IPDs even though they have experienced massive amounts of repetition (Clements & Stephens, 1995) . Moreover, although the complete empirical picture is complex, this tendency to favor defection over the long-run has been widely reported elsewhere (e.g. Scodel et al., 1959; Colman, 1982; Gardner et al., 1984; Green et al., 1995) .
Following the conventional view of the IPD, cooperators forego a large immediate gain (the temptation) in order to achieve a stream of intermediate size gains in the long run. Theory suggests (e.g. Kagel et al., 1986; Benson & Stephens, 1996; Stephens et al., 1997) however, that animals should de-value delayed bene"ts. Moreover, as my colleagues and I have pointed out (Stephens et al., 1997) , experimental measurements of animal discounting show a surprisingly strong e!ect on preference. For example, my laboratory has shown that a 40 s re-arrangement of the payo! within an IPD matrix can turn cooperative behavior on and o!. This tendency to discount future bene"ts limits cooperativeness in the IPD, because it devalues the stream of future gains that are supposed to make cooperation worthwhile. I have hypothesized, therefore, that the relevance of the IPD to animal cooperation may be severely limited by the strong discounting that I and other experimentalists have observed.
In evaluating this hypothesis, we would like to know a great deal more about discounting. For example, current studies of discounting all focus on food reward, and focus on a relatively narrow range of animal species (typically small birds and mammals). In this paper, however, I assume that strong discounting is the norm and ask whether there is some way to arrange an IPD-like game that can overcome strong animal preferences for immediate reward? I will argue for a simple, and intuitively appealing mechanism that, in theory, can overcome discounting. The idea is that if the gains derived from a sequence of plays accumulate, only becoming available to the players at the end of a given number of interactions, then not only is the &&immediacy'' of the temptation to cheat e!ectively removed, but a reciprocating opponent has a chance to punish a cheater before it realizes any gains from its anti-social behavior.
Review of the Basic Model
To understand the role of discounting and accumulation in PD-like games, it is helpful to review the basic theory behind cooperation in the where C represents &&cooperation'' and D &&defec-tion'', and the matrix entries show the row player's bene"ts; the numerical payo!s are a famous example; in general we require ¹'R'P'S and R'(¹#S)/2. Following Axelrod & Hamilton's (1981) famous analysis, stable mutual cooperation can be achieved if the opponents play repeatedly, and they adopt a conditionally cooperative strategy like tit-for-tat (abbreviated TFT; a tit-for-tat player chooses C on the "rst play, and copies his opponent's move on all subsequent plays). Then the game matrix Column player Row player
shows the relative merits of TFT and an alternative, consistently defecting, opponent (All-D). Where, w is usually interpreted as the probability that the game will continue from one play to next. Focusing on the term w/(1!w) (which is the expected repetition of the game), one can see that all entries in the matrix are in the familiar slope}intercept form for the equation of a straight line (cf. the solid lines in Fig. 1 ). Comparing the &&TFT vs. TFT'' cell to the &&All-D vs. TFT'' cell, one can see that the All-D vs. TFT cell has the higher intercept (since ¹'R), but smaller slope (since R'P). This means that defecting is a sensible strategy if the game is played only a few times, but for larger amounts of repetition the conditionally cooperative strategy tit-for-tat can be sensible. &&typical'' and cumulative-bene"t games.
show the conventional analysis of All-D vs. TFT. The thicker line shows how the bene"ts increase with time when All-D plays TFT, while the thinner line shows TFT vs. TFT. The two &&dashed'' staircases show how bene"ts increase with time in a cumulative bene"t game (accumulation period, n"2) .
with triangles at its vertices shows All-D vs. TFT and the thinner (with circles) shows TFT vs. TFT. In conventional games there exists a time, early in the game, where a defector is &&ahead'' of a TFT player, and small w's make it hard to overcome this early advantage. Cumulative bene"t games can eliminate this early advantage.
DISCOUNTING
To see how discounting enters our analysis, consider the calculation of the TFT vs. TFT cell above. To calculate the expected bene"ts in this case, we simply write
where we &&discount'' the reward obtained at i-th play by the probability that play will continue until the i-th play, wG. If in addition to this termination risk discounting, the value of a bene"t obtained at the i-th play is actually less than the value available in the preceding play, then we must modify this calculation. In the simplest case, imagine that the w is the product of two elements the probability that play will continue from one play to the next, and the proportion of a bene"t's value that is retained from one play to next, then we can re-write the expression above as
Clearly, this does not change the form of the model in any meaningful way. We still require a relatively large w to maintain cooperative behavior, but we interpret w more broadly. My hypothesis, that strong discounting limits cooperativeness, is equivalent to the claim that is typically small, say smaller than 0.1, and this limits the magnitude of w, because ' "w. I remark that the unfortunate tendency to suppose that w is determined solely by the likelihood of repetition is peculiar to biological modelers (see May, 1981; Stephens et al., 1995; Dugatkin, 1997 , for exceptions); for example, Axelrod (1984) called w &&the shadow of the future'', a phrase that allows considerable room for interpretation. In the following, I call w the future value term, a name chosen to suggest that w measures the general value of future bene"ts regardless of whether repetition or discounting determines this &&value''.
Cumulative-bene5t Games
In this section, I accept the premise that the future value term w is small, possibly because is small, and I ask whether one can construct a scenario where cooperation can be maintained in spite of w's smallness.
Consider two individuals playing a sequence of games, as one typically imagines in the repeated games literature, except that some mechanism withholds the bene"ts until the pair has completed n plays. If, for example, n"2, the players get nothing at the end of the "rst play, but obtain the combined bene"ts of the "rst and second play, after they play a second time. I call n the accumulation period. To see the e!ect of where ¹#(n!1) P is the gain from the "rst n plays (by convention we &&start the clock'' at the end of the "rst play, so there are n!1 rather than n intervals). Similarly, expected gains from the next bout of n plays are wL\nP,
where nP are the gains from a completed bout of n plays and wL\ is the expected proportion of that value retained at the end of the second bout.
The expected gains from a sequence of these plays is
This is the "rst of four cells in a modi"ed version of the classic TFT vs. 
The form of this matrix is exactly the same as Matrix 2, the classical, elementary analysis of TFT vs. All-D. In parallel with the classical analysis, TFT can be stable against All-D, if n!1 is large enough; n!1 is not, however, the expected repetition of the game, but the period over which bene"ts accumulate. As in Axelrod and Hamilton's original analysis some form of conditional cooperation is required: unconditional cooperation (All-C) fares no better against All-D in an accumulated game than it does in a traditional IPD. The key di!erence between this and Matrix 2's traditional analysis is that here, if n is large enough, All-D never realizes any advantage; because by the time payo!s are distributed All-D's ill-gotten ¹ has been diluted by n!1 P payo!s, so All-D achieves a smaller payo! than it could have had by playing TFT. Figure 1 shows this graphically. Figure 1 shows the conventional TFT vs. TFT, All-D vs. TFT payo!s as intersecting straight lines. The comparable payo!s for an accumulated game are shown as dashed-staircases that &&sample'' the conventional lines at the points of accumulation. If the period of accumulation is large enough, the short-term advantage of All-D is eliminated simply because bene"ts cannot be collected until after the two (conventional) bene-"t lines have crossed.
This idea raises many intriguing questions about how such games might arise in nature. I defer this question to the discussion, but comment that the idea that one can encourage &&cooperativeness'' by controlling the timing of payo!s is part of the everyday logic of human commerce. The plumber is much more likely to explain the merits of one repair technique over another, or to consult about some other minor annoyance, if the homeowner withholds payment until after he or she is satis"ed with the plumber's workmanship and explanations.
Evolved Strategies in Cumulative Games
As a "rst step, I have pitted tit-for-tat against All-D in order to study how accumulation might e!ect cooperative behavior; however, the literature of the Prisoner's Dilemma contains many possible strategies together with studies of strategic interaction [see Dugatkin, (1997) for a thoughtful, up-to-date review]. One would like, therefore, to consider the combined e!ects of accumulation (n) and future value preservation (w) for a broader class of strategies. I did this by simulating the evolution of a fairly general class of strategies; that is, the class of strategies that can be represented by a 5-element vector of probabilities (t, r, p, s, c) , where t is the probability of cooperating after visiting the ¹ cell of the matrix (note that in a cumulative game the bene"t of ¹ might not be collected until some later time); similarly, r, p and s are the probabilities of cooperating after the R, P and S cells have been visited; c is the probability of initial cooperation. This scheme, similar to one used by Nowak & Sigmund (1993) , and identical to that of Stephens et al. (1995) can be used to represent many of the &&classic'' strategies of the "eld [e.g. TFT is (t"1, r"1, p"0, s" 0, c"1), Pavlov is (t"0, r"1, p"1, s"0, c"unspeci"ed) ].
Consider a pair of strategies, S
From the point of view of player 1, we can specify the dynamic transitions within a sequence of plays by constructing a transition matrix M; this matrix speci-"es the probabilities of transitions from the states +¹ R P S, on the i-th play to the same states on the next, or i#1st, play. Construction of this matrix is straightforward (details in . In addition, we need a vector of probabilities, c, that give the probabilities of the four states before play has begun; this vector can be constructed from the c and c components of the strategy vectors. From the point of the view of the two players, the transition matrix M and the initial distribution vector c represent a complete description of their pair-wise interaction. Appendix A shows that player 1's payo! is
where n is the period of accumulation. Player 2's payo! is
(the payo! vector is simply re-ordered to re#ect the fact that whenever player 1 gets ¹, player 2 gets S). Note that the terms ¹, R, P and S are used in two ways; to denote the payo!s accruing when the events DC, CC, DD and CD occur*as in the row vector above, and as a shorthand for the events themselves as in the set notation +¹, R, P, S, used earlier in this paragraph. I studied eqns (1) and (2) using an evolutionary algorithm, following the principles outlined by Back (1996) . Appendix B shows the structure of my algorithm, and gives many of its key parameters. I restricted my attention to the classical payo! matrix (¹"5, R"3, P"1, S"0), focusing my attention on investigating a wide range of accumulation periods (n"1, 5, 10 and 25) and future value parameters (w"0.01, 0.25, 0.75 and 0.99). I ran 20, 5000 generation runs at each (n, w) pair.
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Results: Simulated Evolution of Strategies PATTERNS OF COOPERATIVENESS I considered three similar measures of cooperativeness that vary from short to long term. In each case, I take the mean strategy in the population after 5000 generations, and ask how cooperative it is when playing against itself. The three measures are:
Short term: P (CC), the probability that two average players will achieve mutual cooperation on the "rst play of an interaction. This measure uses only the c element of the strategy vector (c"P (CC)), and ignores the other four elements (t, r, p, s) .
Intermediate term: P (CC), the expected proportion of mutual cooperation (CC events) in the "rst "ve plays in an interaction.
ong term: P QR?R (CC), the stationary probability of mutual cooperation (the relative frequency of CC after a long sequence of plays). This measure uses only the &&reactive'' elements of the strategy vector (t, r, p and s), and ignores the initial cooperativeness (c). Figure 2 shows the e!ects of future value (w) and accumulation (n) on these measures of cooperativeness. All three measures show a similar pattern. I found high levels of cooperation for all values of the future value parameter, w, when accumulation periods where large (n"10 and 25). Similarly, I found high levels of cooperation for all values of the accumulation period (n) when the future value parameter w was su$ciently high (w"0.99). This similarity supports the idea, discussed above, that accumulation (high n) and &&repetition'' (high w) promote cooperative behavior in a logically similar way. One sees this pattern most clearly for the shortest term measure of cooperativeness (P (CC)). The pattern is less clear, for the longest term measure (P QR?R (CC)); plots of this measure [ Fig. 2(c) ] show some surprises. First, we see elevated levels of P QR?R (CC) when there is no accumulation n"1, and a very low future value term (w"0.01). This anomaly arises when w"0.01 because the animal's time horizon is so short that only the c element of the strategy matters (it evolves toward zero), while the other elements of the strategy vector drift about irrelevantly leading to P QR?R (CC) near the random level of 1/4. Intriguingly, the same logic does not seem to apply when there is a small accumulation period (n"5) even when w is equally low. Evidently, n"5 lengthens the time horizon enough to make the other elements of the strategy relevant, but not enough to encourage cooperation. Second, when w"0.99 we see higher levels of P QR?R (CC) with accumulation levels lower (n"1 and 5); this is the "rst hint we see of a general pattern in which high accumulation periods (high n) favor short-term cooperativeness, and high future value (high w) favors longterm cooperativeness. The analysis of strategies in the next section will help to clarify this pattern. EVOLVED STRATEGIES Figure 3 shows a somewhat bewildering summary of strategies that evolved in each of the 16 cases I studied. The inverted L-shaped region formed by the top row and left-hand column represent high n and high w cases that are the &&most cooperative'' strategies. Inspection of this region suggests that cooperative strategies are quite similar to one another, with high r (probability of cooperating after mutual cooperation) and high c (probability of initial cooperation) and smaller values for the other three elements of the strategy. A exploratory analysis showed a striking bimodality in cooperativeness; with strategies being either &&cooperators'' or &&defectors''. Table 1 shows a comparison of the most and least cooperative strategies, where &&most cooperative'' means the median of the most cooperative third of the strategies (cooperativeness measured as P (CC)), and &&least cooperative'' means the median of the least cooperative third.
For the evolved cooperator, the initial and stationary distributions di!er markedly (Table 1) ; the relative frequency of mutual cooperation erodes dramatically as play continues, while the relative frequency of mutual defection builds from near zero at "rst, to over one-third (cf. initial and stationary distributions). The transition matrix shows that departures from mutual cooperation (state R) are most likely to lead to the weakly attractive mutual defection state (P). The of mutual cooperation because mutual C persists once established; however, once players leave this state the strategy lacks a clear path back to mutual cooperation. In contrast, the evolved defector is remarkably consistent.
This dynamic pattern shown by the evolved cooperator (i.e. departure from CC leads to DD, leads weakly back to CC) reminds one of Pavlov (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) , except that the link from DD back to CC is much weaker. The evolved cooperator also resembles retaliator, a strategy that cooperates initially, cooperates with a cooperator, but permanently switches to defection if its opponent defects. Its not reasonable to think of our evolved cooperator as a mixture of Pavlov [in 5-element notation (0, 1, 1, 0, 1)], and retaliator (0, 1, 0, 0, 1); a bit closer to retaliator than to Pavlov. CUMULATIVE BENEFIT GAMES 7 FIG. 3. Evolved strategies for each accumulation period (n) and future value (w) condition. I used medians to summarize the results of my simulated evolution experiments, calculating median population levels of t, r, p, s and c at the end of each of 20 5000 generation runs for a given n and w combination. The "gure shows these results. A Tukey-style box and whisker plot (see Cleveland, 1993) shows the distribution of these 20 medians in each case.
IS ALL COOPERATION THE SAME?
As outlined above, di!erences in w and n lead to large di!erences in cooperativeness, (Fig. 2) , and these di!erences arise from a striking bimodality in strategies as shown in Table 1 . In the next few paragraphs, I consider a more subtle level of strategic variation. I ask whether there are e!ects of future value w and accumulation n, within the class of &&cooperative strategies'' (de"ned as strategies with P (CC) values in the upper one-third).
I begin by contrasting two extremes to help frame the analysis. future value'' case (w"0.01, n"25). Table 2 shows that the accumulation cooperator is more likely to cooperate initially, and less likely to cooperate after an instance of mutual defection (state P). Accumulation emphasizes initial cooperation and de-emphasizes returning to mutual cooperation after a perturbation. In contrast, the conventional, future value cooperator seems to emphasize returning to cooperation after a mutual defection, and de-emphasizes initial cooperation. Crudely speaking, the accumulation cooperator is a more &&retaliator-like'' strategy that appears to arise because success in the "rst bout is the key to success in the accumulated game (a &&whatever gets you through the bout'' strategy); the future value cooperator is more CUMULATIVE BENEFIT GAMES &&Pavlov-like'' taking a long-term view, apparently at the expense of initial cooperation. In a more formal exploration of the e!ects of accumulation and future value, I performed a two-way analysis of variance on each of the "ve elements of the strategy (i.e. "ve separate ANOVAs using arcsin transformed probabilities as the dependent measure), still restricting my attention to the one-third most cooperative strategies. In each case, I examined the residuals of the "tted ANOVA model for signs of non-normality and for evidence of systematic changes in variance. These examinations justify my use of ANOVA for these analyses. I found that neither w nor n had any e!ect on the s, r or t elements of cooperative strategies*partially con"rming the impression that cooperative strategies are similar. I did "nd signi"cant di!erences in initial cooperativeness (c) and in the tendency to cooperate following mutual defection (p), in agreement with the simpler comparison made earlier.
I found simple main e!ects of w and n on c, but no interaction (w: F "34.0, P(10; n: F "5.9, P(10\). The probability of initial cooperation, c, is markedly smaller when the future value parameter is highest [ Fig. 4(a) ]. There is a less marked, but signi"cant, trend toward smaller c values at high levels of accumulation [again see Fig. 4(a) ].
Analysis of variance reveals a more complex pattern for p, the probability of cooperation following mutual defection: a signi"cant w by n interaction (F "3.7, P(0.01) and signi"cant main e!ects of both w and n (w: F "16.6, P(10; n: F "3,4, P(0.05). Again, one sees a marked di!erence between the highest w case (w"0.99) and all the others, with larger p values occurring when w"0.99 regardless of n's magnitude. Superimposed on this we see an intriguing w by n interaction in which p decreases with accumulation (n) when future value is highest (w"0.99), but decreases with accumulation at lower future values [ Fig. 4(b) ]. Figure 4 shows several intriguing patterns. Firstly, one see a striking di!erence between the highest w cases (w"0.99) and all others. When w"0.99, c is lowest and p highest: in words, high future value emphasizes long-term cooperation*i.e. returning to mutual cooperation from mutual defection*and de-emphasizes initial cooperation. It makes sense to view this di!erence (i.e. w"0.99 vs. w(0.99) as the di!erence between long-term and short-term cooperation. Notice, for example, that with the low w cases (w(0.99) strategies shift toward long-term behavior as n increases (i.e. c decreases and p increases with n).
THE c/p TRADEOFF
The pattern seen here suggests a trade-o! between c and p; with high c and low p combinations occurring when accumulation favors short-term cooperativeness, and low c-high p combinations occurring with high future value favors long-term cooperativeness. Why should such a trade-o! exist? Why not cooperative initially and in the long-run? To answer these questions, consider a situation with low future value and an intermediate level of accumulation. This situation places a premium on extracting the most bene"t from a relatively short interaction, the best way to accomplish this is to establish mutual cooperation initially; if however, someone defects then the other player must move quickly to avoid a string of sucker's payo!. Once mutual defection is established there is typically little time left in the bout, and attempts to reestablish mutual cooperation via generosity are a gamble that may lead to mutual cooperation or to the sucker's payo!. Without the deadline of bout termination the future value cooperator has the luxury of relying on the dynamics of the game to establish mutual cooperation even if this means accepting a few sucker's payo!s.
Discussion
Elsewhere (Clements & Stephens, 1995; Stephens et al., 1995) , my colleagues and I have argued that strong preferences for immediate reward (discounting) may limit the IPD's value as a model of animal cooperation. In this paper, I ask whether we can re-organize games to overcome strong discounting. The simplest way to achieve cooperation in the face of discounting is via by-product mutualism. In mutualism there is no temptation to cheat, so mutually bene"cial joint action is in both player's short-term best interests. Clearly, cooperation via mutualism is D) ] vary among the most cooperative strategies. The "gure shows how these elements vary with w and n for the one-third most cooperative strategies. These are no entries for some cases (e.g. w"0.01, n"1) because there were no cooperative strategies in these situations. Tukey-style box and whisker plots summarize the distributions of the data.
fundamental; and as a growing number of authors have suggested, probably the basic form of cooperation in animal behavior (see, for example, Pusey & Packer, 1997; Dugatkin, 1997; Stephens et al., 1997) .
There is, however, considerable theoretical interest in how one might achieve cooperation in the face of a temptation to cheat. I suggest, here, a relatively simple mechanism to achieve cooperation even when there is a temptation to cheat and strong discounting. I argue that delaying all the bene"ts from a sequence of plays via accumulation, can eliminate the immediate temptation to cheat and enhance the relative value of a conditionally cooperative strategy. In broad outline, the cumulative payo! game is similar to the conventional Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with the accumulation period (n) playing a role CUMULATIVE BENEFIT GAMES similar to the conventional model's probability of repeated play (cf. e.g. Matrices 2 and 3). Although accumulation increases the relative value of conditionally cooperative strategies, the delay inherent in cumulative games reduces the overall value of the interaction. Cumulative games, therefore, are likely to play their most signi"cant role in promoting cooperation when a player's options elsewhere are poor. Many readers will "nd the idea that &&hard times'' promote cooperativeness to be an intuitively appealing one; while this is an immediate consequence of the accumulated games model, it is less clear how this prediction might arise in either conventional iterated games, or in simple mutualism.
The idea that accumulation enhances cooperativeness agrees with our intuition about human interactions. I encourage my colleagues to cooperate by reminding them of the bene"ts to be obtained at the end of a successful interaction. If I want to guarantee that my child will be well-behaved, I structure my bribe so that the reward follows his good behavior: &&if you're very good I'll buy you a toy after grandma's visit''. The idea presented here is that structuring payo!s in this way, is a mechanism to overcome the temptations of immediacy and the sel"shness that immediate grati"cation implies.
COMPARISON WITH THE CONVENTIONAL IPD
Unilateral cooperation (All-C) is unstable in both the cumulative and conventional iterated games: a cooperator must somehow punish defection if mutual cooperation is to be stable. In the conventional game a defector realizes the large payo! ¹ immediately, it may get less in the long-run because its opponent tries to punish it, but it has ¹ now. In the accumulated game a large payo! ¹ may accrue, but it is not available until the end of the bout; the defector's opponent has time to make its punishment count! This assumes, of course, that the &&defec-tion'' occurs before the end of the bout. Why should not a player defect on the last play of a bout of accumulation? After all, when only a single play remains, your opponent cannot punish you before you collect your &&winnings''. Following the familiar backward-induction argument (see for example Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992) of the "nitely repeated PD, one might reasonably expect All-D to predominate in games with "xed accumulation periods. While this scenario seems logical, All-D did not predominate in my simulated evolution of strategies. This may be because of the threat of punishment in the next bout, or because the form of the strategies studied here did not permit a rule such as &&defect only on play n!1''. However, one possible advantage of the retaliator-like strategies that arose under accumulation, is that they reduce a player's chances of being suckered at the end of a bout. In any case, the "xed bout-length model studied here is a simpli"cation. A more complete model would overcome this objection by adding some uncertainty to bout length.
NATURAL ACCUMULATED GAMES?
The reader might reasonably ask whether accumulated games arise in nature. While I did not intend the situation modeled here to represent any particular natural situation, I believe that there may be many natural situations in which interacting individuals achieve substantial bene-"ts only after engaging in a sequence of interactions. Of course, we do not require that bene"ts accumulate is some literal &&bin'', the key idea is that continued cooperative joint action somehow increases the bene"ts available at some future time. For example, a pair of birds engaged in cooperatively feeding their nestlings can only achieve the bene"t of #edged young after a protracted sequence of feeding events. Consider a pair of carnivores, say lionesses, cooperatively stalking a large prey animal. Stalking is not a single action but a sequence of approach and pause actions; and a successful kill can be achieved only after a sequence of &&approaches''. The vocal duetting long-tailed manakins (Chiroxiphia linearis, McDonald & Potts, 1994) provides a spectacular and informative example. In this system, pairs of males attract females via elaborate vocal duetting on small traditional lekking arenas. However, only the -male obtains any matings. McDonald and Pott's interpretation is that the accepts its secondary role in order to establish itself as the new owner of the lekking arena when the male dies. In contrast to the model studied here, the long-tailed manakin scenario is strongly asymmetric, with an iterated game for the player, and what may be an accumulated game for the player. The player faces an accumulated game if we suppose (a) that repeated interactions increase its likelihood of eventually inheriting the arena, and (b) the has some mechanism of retaliation that reduces the 's chances of inheritance.
EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
This discussion brings us naturally to the question of how one might extend and improve upon the current model. The manakin example suggests that asymmetries are important. Notice, however, that in the manakin scenario the players not only face di!erent game matrices, but di!erent &&blends'' of immediate and delayed consequences. This suggests that it will be important to consider matrices that have some immediate, and some accumulating (or delayed) consequences. Another interesting class of extensions concerns the rules of bout termination (to simplify terminology here, I am using bout to mean bout of accumulation, rather that the duration of play). As mentioned above, the "nite-length bouts of accumulation may act against cooperative behavior, so one might explore models of random bout length. There are, however, many other ways in which bouts might end. If, as I have argued, long bouts of accumulation encourage cooperativeness, then this opens the possibility that a player might manipulate his opponent's cooperativeness by exercising some control over when bene"ts are distributed. In its most extreme form, this is the bribery scenario mentioned above. Another simple possibility is that the level of accumulated bene"ts determines the timing of payo! distribution: that is, bene"ts are realized not after some "xed number of plays, but when a speci"c payo! condition is reached, e.g. when a kill is made.
If games are organized into bouts of accumulation, then this raises the possibility that strategies might re#ect this bout structure in some way. For example, an animal might be more (or less) forgiving between bouts than within bouts, or it might &&start fresh'' at the beginning of each new bout. Clearly, the idea of bouts of accumulation introduces a new wrinkle into strategies that may be a productive direction for further study.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE IPD
As mentioned earlier, a handful of authors have questioned the IPD's empirical usefulness (e.g. Clements & Stephens, 1995; Heinshon & Packer, 1995; Stephens et al., 1995) . An even larger group, however, view the IPD scenario as too restrictive to justify its historical role as the central paradigm of animal cooperation Connor, 1995a; Pusey & Packer, 1997) . In response, I presume, to these sentiments there is a growing literature of alternative models. For example, Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995) suggest that the simple mechanism of punishment deserves a more careful consideration; similarly, Nowak & Sigmund (1998) have recently reformulated the venerable idea of indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Pollock & Dugatkin, 1992) . Taken together this growing family of models represents an important step toward an enlarged view of animal cooperation. While the model advocated here is very much in sympathy with this enterprise, it is somewhat di!erent. Rather than advocating an entirely new scenario for cooperation, the accumulated games model suggests how we might modify the conventional IPD to overcome the speci"c problem of temporal discounting. Connor's (1995a, b) model of reciprocity via parceling is similar to the accumulation model in several respects. To outline these similarities, I brie#y explain the parceling model. Connor develops his model in the context of allogrooming in ungulates (Hart & Hart, 1992) . In this system, one individual initiates bouts of reciprocal grooming, when it delivers a brief bout of grooming to another. The recipient may then choose to reciprocate with a brief stint of grooming, and so the cycle repeats until one player terminates it. Suppose that the "tness bene"ts of grooming are strongly nonlinear, approaching a step function: small amounts of grooming fail to satisfy a recipient's needs for parasite removal, with bene"ts rising sharply when prolonged grooming achieves a satisfactory state.
Obviously, an initiator who satis"ed a recipient's need in one long, unconditional bout of grooming would invite cheating (why reciprocate when you have everything you need?). By the CUMULATIVE BENEFIT GAMES converse logic an initiator can reduce the temptation to cheat by stopping its bout of grooming before the recipient has all the grooming it wants. The recipient may still be tempted to cheat if it is easy to "nd a string of gullible initiators. If, however, "nding donors is costly, the initiator may be able to reduce its bout of grooming to a size that e!ectively eliminates the temptation to cheat.
The step function that relates bene"t to grooming received, and the parceling of grooming into brief bouts creates an accumulated game; because these two factors combine to create a situation where a sequence of reciprocated bouts is required to achieve a meaningful &&payo!''. I remark that my description of Connor's model di!ers somewhat from the original. The idea of step function like bene"t function is not explicit in Connor's formal, but implied by the idea that an individual receiving a small initiation bout of grooming is still far from satis"ed. In addition, Connor correctly emphasizes the need for uncertainty in the duration of interactions, which I have de-emphasized in order to simplify the situation, and to stress the similarity with the "xed bout accumulation model presented above.
Conclusions
I have argued that one can promote the relative value of cooperative action by arranging games so that payo!s accumulate over a sequence of actions. This agrees with our intuition: a bribe will be more e!ective if it is withheld until after the desired action. In addition, cooperation in these cumulative bene"t games should be most important in di$cult times. The idea of cumulative bene"t games has implications for future experiment and observational work. For example, my laboratory is conducting an experiment in which food bene"ts accumulate, visible but unavailable over a sequence of plays. For the "eld worker, the possibility of cumulative bene"t games suggests that careful observation of the temporal relationship between action and consequence may enrich our understanding of natural cooperative systems, and provide much needed guidance for future models. Finally, cumulative bene"t games emphasize a new dimension of strategic interaction: can animals encourage others to cooperate by sub-dividing games (as Conner has suggested), or by exerting some other form of control over the timing of their partner's bene"ts?
APPENDIX A Bene5t Calculations
Consider a strategy represented by a vector of nine probabilities, u" (t, r, p, s, c, t, r, p, s) . Where t represents the probability of cooperating given that the focal player defected and its opponent cooperated in the previous play (i.e. a bene"t of ¹ accrues to the focal player). The r, p and s probabilities represent the probabilities of cooperation following bene"t accruals of R, P and S, respectively. The term c represents the probability of initial cooperation. The parameters t, r, p, and s apply within the bout of n plays, while the analogous terms denoted with prime symbols t, r, p, s apply between bouts (thus allowing for the possibility that a bout-structured game, might have a bout-structured strategy).
If we have two such strategy vectors in hand, say S and S , we can calculate three entities that characterize the strategy interaction: (i) M the within-bout transition matrix, (ii) B the between-bout transition matrix, and (iii) c the initial distribution of states. One can readily calculate these entities from the de"nitions of the components of the strategy vector (see, e.g. Stephens et al., 1995) . Finally, I de"ne v to be the column vector of payo!s (¹ R P S). Note that I de"ne these entities so that they re#ect the states experienced by the S player.
BOUT-BY-BOUT CONSTRUCTION OF
BENEFITS
The expected bene"t from the "rst bout of n plays is v(I#M#M#2#ML\) c, which must be devalued by wL\. The expected bene"ts from the second bout of n can be calculated in exactly the same way, once we recognize that the &&initial state'' at the beginning of this bout is BML\c and not simply c, i.e. A standard result from linear algebra (Burden & Faires, 1985) show that the in"nite series
I#wLBML\#wL(BML\)
#2"(I!wLBML\)\, so we may write the total bene"t compactly as wL\ v (I#M#M#2#ML\) ;(I!wLBML\)\c. I remark, also, that considerable computable e!ort can be saved by recognizing that there exists a "xed relationship between the payo! received by the focal player and the payo! received by its opponent. So, we can calculate the term
wL\(I#M#M#2#ML\)
;(I!wLBML\)\c only once; multiply by row vector (¹, R, P, S) to "nd the focal player's total bene"t, and by (S, R, P, ¹ ) to "nd the opponent's bene"t.
APPENDIX B Evolutionary Algorithm
Create Initial Population. Create 200 vectors of 5 probabilities, each entry uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Repeat for 5000 generations:
